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United Kingdom  
Dr Andriani Kalintiri* and Dr Ryan Stones** 
 
A. Competition Policy in the Digital Economy: Shift in Focus? 
Question 1. What are the main cases dealing with the digital economy (focusing on 
digital businesses or on the competition between digital businesses and incumbent 
operators) initiated and completed by your competition authority? 
Digital markets have been the focus of both antitrust and merger enforcement action by the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and its predecessors, the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) and the Competition Commission (CC).1 
The main completed antitrust cases dealing with the digital economy are listed in Table 1.2 
Year Case Issue Outcome 
2019 
Digital pianos and 
keyboards3 
Online RPM Infringement 
2017 Sports equipment sector4 Online sales ban Infringement 
 
Live online auction platform 
services5 
Exclusivity, MFN clauses, 
advertising restrictions 
Commitments 
 Light fittings6 Online RPM Infringement 
2016 
Online sales of posters and 
frames7 
Algorithmic collusion Infringement 
 Commercial refrigeration8 Online RPM Infringement 
 Bathroom fittings9 Online RPM Infringement 
2014 Mobility aids - Pride10 Online RPM Infringement 
                                               
*Lecturer in Competition Law, King’s College London (andriani.kalintiri@kcl.ac.uk). 
**Lecturer in Law, City, University of London (ryan.stones@city.ac.uk).  
1On 1 April 2014 the functions of the CC and OFT were transferred to the CMA under the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013 (ERRA13). Unless otherwise indicated, references to the CMA must also be understood as 
including its predecessors. 
2 As at 13 October 2019. 
3https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/musical-instruments-and-equipment-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements-
50565-2.  
4https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/sports-equipment-sector-anti-competitive-practices#infringement-decision.  
5https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/auction-services-anti-competitive-practices. 
6https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/light-fittings-sector-anti-competitive-practices#settlement-and-infringement-
decision.  
7https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-sales-of-discretionary-consumer-products.  
8https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/commercial-catering-sector-investigation-into-anti-competitive-
practices#settlement-and-infringement-decision.  
9https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/bathroom-fittings-sector-investigation-into-anti-competitive-
practices#infringement-decision.  
10https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-agreements-in-the-mobility-aids-sector.  
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2013 Mobility aids - Roma11 
Online sales and price 
advertising ban 
Infringement 
Table 1: Completed UK digital economy antitrust cases 
 
Several antitrust investigations relating to the digital economy were closed on administrative 
priority grounds, as Table 2 shows. 
Year Case Issue 
2017 Mobility scooters12 
Online price advertising 
restrictions 
2016 Energy price comparison websites13 Digital comparison tools 
2015 Hotel online booking14 RPM/MFN clauses 
 MasterCard and Visa15 
Interchange fees for card 
payments 
2013 Amazon16 MFN policy 
2011 eBooks17 MFN clauses 
Table 2: UK Digital economy antitrust cases closed on administrative priority grounds 
 
Furthermore, the CMA has investigated several digital economy mergers; Table 3 provides an 
indicative list.18 These have involved payment services, cashback websites, credit comparison 
platforms (CCP) and credit checking tools (CCT), online food and travel platforms, digital 
comparison tools and online gambling. 
Year Case Market/Sector Outcome 
2019 PayPal/iZettle19 
Offline and omni-channel 
payment services 
Phase 2 Clearance 
                                               
11https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-agreements-in-the-mobility-aids-sector.  
12https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/medical-equipment-anti-competitive-practices. This was closed after the 
restrictions ended. 
13https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/energy-price-comparison-websites-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements. The 
case was no longer an administrative priority following implementation of the remedies from the Energy Market 
investigation and the market study into digital comparison tools.  
14https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/hotel-online-booking-sector-investigation. This investigation followed a 
commitment decision which was subsequently annulled by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)(Skyscanner v 
CMA [2014] CAT 16) and was closed on administrative priority grounds, given developments in the hotel online 
booking sector regarding MFN clauses.  
15https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-interchange-fees-mastercard-visa-mifs. This case was no 
longer a CMA priority upon the entry into force of Regulation 2015/751 on interchange fees for card-based payment 
transactions. 
16https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/amazon-online-retailer-investigation-into-anti-competitive-practices. The case 
was closed when Amazon ended its MFN policy. 
17https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/e-books-investigation-into-anti-competitive-arrangements-between-some-
publishers-and-retailers. This was investigated by the European Commission (COMP/39847, Ebooks). 
18 Cases below UK jurisdictional requirements were not included (e.g. MoneySupermarket/MoneySaving Expert 
(https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/moneysupermarket-moneysavingexpert); Expedia/Trivago 
(https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/expedia-inc-trivago-gmbh)). 
19https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/paypal-holdings-inc-izettle-ab-merger-inquiry.  
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 TopCashBack/Quidco20 Cashback websites Phase 2 Cancellation 
 Experian/ClearScore21 CCPs and CCTs Phase 2 Cancellation 
 eBay/Motors.co.uk22 
Online-classified vehicle 
advertising 
Phase 1 Clearance 
2018 Nielsen/AdIntel23 Advertising intelligence Phase 2 Clearance 
 
Moneysupermarket.com/ 
Decision Technologies24 
Digital comparison tools  Phase 1 Clearance 
 
ATG Media 
Holdings/Lottissimo25 
Live online bidding auction 
platform services 
Phase 1 Clearance 
 
Stars UK/Sky Betting and 
Gaming26 
Online gambling services Phase 1 Clearance 
2017 Just Eat/Hungryhouse27 Online food platforms Phase 2 Clearance 
 Blackbaud/Giving28 Online fundraising platforms Phase 1 Clearance 
2015 
CVC Capital 
Partners/Sky Bet29 
Online payment services for 
online betting and gaming 
Phase 1 Clearance 
2013 
Motorola Mobility 
(Google)/ 
Waze Mobile30 
Turn-by-turn navigation 
applications for mobile 
devices 
Phase 1 Clearance 
 
Web Reservations 
International/ 
Hostelbookers.com31 
Online travel agencies for 
hostel accommodation 
Phase 1 Clearance 
 Priceline.com/Kayak32 
Online travel agents and 
price comparison site 
Phase 1 Clearance 
2012 Digital Property/Zoopla33 
Online property advertising 
portals 
Phase 1 Clearance 
 Facebook/Instagram34 Virtual networking services Phase 1 Clearance 
 Experian/192business35 
Online identity verification 
and authentication services 
Phase 1 Clearance 
                                               
20https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/topcashback-quidco-merger-inquiry.  
21https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/experian-limited-credit-laser-holdings-clearscore.  
22https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/ebay-inc-motors-co-uk-limited-merger-inquiry.  
23https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/nielsen-ebiquity-merger-inquiry.  
24https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/moneysupermarket-com-financial-group-limited-decision-technologies-limited.  
25https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/atg-media-holdings-limited-lot-tissimo-merger-inquiry.   
26https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/stars-uk-sky-betting-and-gaming-merger-inquiry.  
27https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/just-eat-hungryhouse-merger-inquiry.  
28https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/blackbaud-giving-merger-inquiry. 
29https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/cvc-capital-partners-sicav-fis-s-a-sky-bet.  
30https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/motorola-mobility-holding-waze-mobile-ltd.  
31https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/web-reservations-international-hostelbookers-com-ltd.  
32https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/priceline-com-kayak-software-corporation.  
33https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/digital-property-group-zoopla.  
34https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/facebook-instagram-inc.  
35https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/experian-192business-ltd.  
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2011 
Amazon/The Book 
Depository36 
Online book retail Phase 1 Clearance 
 
Google/BeatThatQuote.c
om37 
Consumer finance price 
comparison sites 
Phase 1 Clearance 
Table 3: UK Digital economy merger investigations 
 
At least five digital economy cases are currently pending. Three are Phase 1 merger 
investigations: Amazon/Deliveroo concerning food delivery services;38 Salesforce/Tableau 
Software regarding cloud software and data analytics;39 and Bottomline 
Technologies/Experian concerning payments processing.40 Furthermore, there are at least 
two antitrust investigations based on Article 101 TFEU and Chapter I of the Competition Act 
1998 (CA1998) in progress. The first involves the use of wide MFN clauses by 
ComparetheMarket, a price comparison website (PCW) for home insurance products.41 The 
second concerns online RPM by Fender, a guitar firm, for which a Statement of Objections 
was issued in October 2019.42 
Question 2. Has your competition authority adapted its enforcement practices in order 
to keep up with the pace of digital markets?  
The CMA has taken several steps to keep up with digital markets. While there have been no 
legislative changes yet, the authority has been keen to adapt its policy and practice. 
In recent years, the CMA has made effective use of its existing tools. First, it has conducted 
several antitrust and merger investigations dealing with the digital economy (see above). 
Second, it has completed market studies into the Commercial Use of Consumer Data (2015)43 
and Digital Comparison Tools (2017)44 and market investigations into Payday Lending 
(2015)45 and Retail Banking (2017).46 Third, it has enforced consumer protection legislation 
on a wide range of issues, including secondary ticketing websites,47 online dating services,48 
online gambling,49 and online reviews and endorsements.50 Fourth, it has built its knowledge 
by drafting a working paper on Pricing Algorithms,51 conducting a literature review on Online 
Search52 and commissioning a report on the ‘Ex-post Assessment of Merger Control Decisions 
                                               
36https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/amazon-com-inc-the-book-depository-international-ltd.  
37https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/google-beatthatquote-com.  
38https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/amazon-deliveroo-merger-inquiry.  
39https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/salesforce-com-inc-tableau-software-inc-merger-inquiry. 
40https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/bottomline-technologies-de-inc-experian-limited-merger-inquiry.  
41https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/price-comparison-website-use-of-most-favoured-nation-clauses. 
42https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/musical-instruments-and-equipment-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements-
50565-3. 
43https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/commercial-use-of-consumer-data.  
44https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/digital-comparison-tools-market-study.  
45https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/payday-lending-market-investigation.  
46https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/review-of-banking-for-small-and-medium-sized-businesses-smes-in-the-uk.  
47https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/secondary-ticketing-websites.  
48https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-dating-services.  
49https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-gambling.  
50https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-endorsements-potential-non-disclosure.  
51https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/746353/Algo
rithms_econ_report.pdf.  
52https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/607077/onlin
e-search-literature-review-7-april-2017.pdf.  
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in Digital Markets’ (Lear Report).53 Fifth, in October 2018 it established a Data, Technology 
and Analytics (DaTA) unit to boost its digital capabilities.54 
Competition in the digital economy has also attracted the attention of the UK Government, 
which invited the CMA’s advice on necessary reforms and appointed a Digital Competition 
Expert Panel to make recommendations on how the existing competition framework could be 
further enhanced to meet the challenges of the digital economy. In February 2019 the CMA’s 
Chairman proposed reforms to the interim measures regime, the authority’s powers to gather 
information and impose sanctions and the strengthening of consumer enforcement.55 In March 
2019 the Digital Competition Expert Panel published its Report on Unlocking Digital 
Competition (Furman Report), which made six strategic recommendations: creating a ‘Digital 
Markets Unit’ with regulatory functions for digital platforms of ‘strategic market status’; 
revisiting merger assessment in digital markets, including the possible adoption of a new 
‘balance of harms’ test; updating the CMA’s enforcement tools against anticompetitive 
conduct, including greater use of interim measures; monitoring machine learning and artificial 
intelligence developments; conducting a market study into digital advertising; and international 
engagement on future steps.56 
The CMA welcomed the recommendations of the Furman Report, which largely supported its 
own proposals. While the authority considers that existing tools have worked well and remain 
relevant in the digital world, they could be strengthened in a number of ways to effectively 
tackle harms in fast-paced digital markets and better protect consumers. Against this 
backdrop, in July 2019 the CMA published its Digital Markets Strategy.57 Its five aims are: to 
use existing tools effectively and efficiently in digital markets; to better understand digital 
business models; to adapt available tools where necessary to meet the challenges of the 
digital economy; to support the Government’s consideration of new regulatory structures in 
digital markets; and to consider potential digital-focused remedies, such as data portability or 
interoperability. In working towards these aims, the CMA has identified seven priorities: (a) to 
use its existing powers to address poor practices and concerns in digital markets; (b) to 
expand the work of the DaTA unit; (c) to conduct a market study on online platforms and digital 
advertising, launched at the same time as its Strategy;58 (d) to review its approach to digital 
mergers, taking into account the feedback provided from its call for information launched in 
June 2019;59 (e) to carry out policy work on a possible ‘Digital Markets Unit’; (f) to support the 
Government, while it considers the CMA Chairman’s proposals for reforms; and (g) to increase 
international cooperation so as to capitalise on the synergies between its own digital markets 
work and that of its counterparts.60 
                                               
53https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/803576/CMA
_past_digital_mergers_GOV.UK_version.pdf.  
54https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/781151/Lette
r_from_Andrew_Tyrie_to_the_Secretary_of_State_BEIS.pdf. 
55 Other proposals include an overriding ‘consumer interest’ duty, increasing the effectiveness of market studies 
and market investigations, and the potential imposition of individual responsibility in competition and consumer 
enforcement. 
56https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-digital-competition-report-of-the-digital-competition-
expert-panel.  
57 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-launches-digital-markets-strategy.  
58 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-platforms-and-digital-advertising-market-study.  
59 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/call-for-information-digital-mergers.  
60 These priorities echo the Government’s 2019 Strategic Steer 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/818676/cma-
strategic-steer-responses.pdf). 
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The UK Government is due to publish a Competition Green Paper analysing the Furman 
Report recommendations, but has already indicated its keenness to take the proposal for a 
Digital Markets Unit forward.61 
Question 3. Is your domestic competition law using the consumer welfare standard as 
its specific goal?  
The CMA’s statutory duty is to ‘promote competition, both within and outside the United 
Kingdom, for the benefit of consumers’.62 An analogous duty is borne by many sector 
regulators with concurrent competition powers.63 The consumer welfare standard best 
portrays the goal of competition law in the UK.64 This is interpreted broadly and not confined 
to prices. In its Prioritisation Principles, the CMA describes consumer welfare as including 
‘better value for consumers in terms of price, quality, range or service, both static and 
dynamic’, as well as ‘non-financial detriment such as the avoidance of physical harm or 
emotional distress’.65 Furthermore, the authority recognises that ‘increased competition in the 
market may deliver further consumer benefits over time resulting from the improved 
competitive process’.66 
In its recent proposals to the Government, the CMA advocated an overriding ‘consumer 
interest’ duty, on the ground that the current one may constrain it ‘from acting to protect 
consumers’ interests unless doing so through purely competition-based remedies’.67 In the 
CMA’s view, such a new duty would be better aligned with its strategic mission ‘to make 
markets work well in the interests of consumers, business and the economy’ and would enable 
it to address new and emerging forms of consumer detriment, although it should not constrain 
it ‘from intervening to promote and protect the competitive process’.68 By contrast, considering 
the need for a paradigm shift, the Furman Report concluded that the current goal is appropriate 
and that ‘UK competition policy should remain rooted in the consumer welfare standard as 
properly conceived, giving sufficient focus to non-price elements of competition, and to 
innovation in particular’.69 
As the consumer welfare standard is conceptualised broadly, it can be applied flexibly, making 
it difficult to tell whether it has been enforced consistently in digital economy cases. In antitrust 
investigations, the focus has predominantly been on price effects, which is unsurprising 
considering the nature of the practices involved (online sales limitations, algorithmic collusion, 
MFN clauses). In merger cases, non-price effects - for instance, on quality and innovation - 
have been taken into account.70 Nevertheless, merger control has been criticised for paying 
insufficient attention to long-run effects - for instance, on quality and choice -71 while the Lear 
                                               
61 See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-opening-london-tech-week-10-june-2019 and 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/808272/Smart-
Data-Consultation.pdf, 17. 
62 ERRA13, §25(3).  
63 E.g. the Office of Communication (Ofcom) is required to ‘further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, 
where appropriate by promoting competition’ (s3(1)(a)-(b) Communications Act 2003). 
64 The Government’s 2015 Strategic Steer to the CMA noted that it should ‘conclude enforcement cases as quickly 
as possible ensuring that it has the maximum possible positive impact on the welfare of consumers’ 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/481040/BIS-
15-659-government-response-governments-strategic-steer-to-the-competition-and-markets-authority.pdf). 
65 §3.1.  
66 §4.10. 
67 Chairman’s Letter (n 54), 9-12. 
68 ibid. 
69 Furman Report (n 56), §3.18-3.23. 
70 See also: Merger Guidelines, §4.2.3 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284449/OFT1
254.pdf); Google/Waze, §28; Experian/ClearScore, §11.69. 
71 Furman Report (n 56) p12 and §4.12. 
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Report identified gaps in the UK authorities’ approach to digital mergers which may have led 
to insufficient consideration of non-price effects.72 
It should be noted that in the UK mergers are subject to a public interest test, where they 
pertain to media plurality, national security and financial stability.73 The House of Lords 
Communications Committee recently recommended a public-interest test for data-driven 
mergers so as to manage the accumulation of data.74 
B. Market Definition and Market Power 
Question 4. How does your competition authority define the market with regard to 
digital economy players? 
The CMA applies the Market Definition Guidelines in antitrust cases75 and the Merger 
Guidelines when reviewing mergers.76 The approach in each document is not identical. Two-
sided markets are considered only in the latter and are defined as ‘platforms (…) that 
intermediate between distinct and unrelated groups of customers’.77 Nevertheless, the 
discussion thereof is brief. The Merger Guidelines simply note the relevance of indirect 
network effects and that ‘prices charged to each set of customers take account of the need to 
get both sets on board’ and acknowledge the difficulties of conducting the hypothetical 
monopolist test. 78 
In principle, the CMA relies on traditional product and geographic area criteria. It generally 
identifies the overlapping activities of the parties in the narrowest plausible market and then 
examines whether this should be widened in view of demand-side and supply-side 
substitution. Depending on the circumstances, a range of factors may be considered, including 
the features of the service or product;79 product or customer segmentation;80 the existence of 
alternative sales, distribution or marketing channels;81 and different business models and 
monetisation strategies.82 Where evidence on substitutability is ambiguous, the CMA typically 
takes a cautious approach, proceeding with the narrower definition.83 Two-sided markets have 
been considered in several merger cases, including Google/BeatThatQuote, Digital 
Property/Zoopla, Facebook/Instagram, Priceline/Kayak, Google/Waze, JustEat/Hungryhouse, 
ATG Media/Lottissimo, Moneysupermarket/Decision Technologies, eBay/Motors, 
Experian/ClearScore and TopCashBack/Quidco.84 Except ATG Media/Lottissimo,85 all other 
                                               
72 Lear Report (n 53), Part II.6. 
73 Enterprise Act 2002, Chapter 2. 
74 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldcomuni/299/29907.htm, §149. 
75https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284423/oft40
3.pdf. 
76https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284449/OFT
1254.pdf 
77 ibid, §5.2.20. 
78 ibid. 
79 e.g. TopCashBack/Quidco, §34-59; Experian/ClearScore, §9.26-9.35; eBay/Motors, §35-36; Blackbaud/Giving, 
§22-26. 
80 e.g. PayPal/iZettle, §6.11-6.24; Experian/ClearScore, §9.19-2.25; eBay/Motors, §37-38; Priceline/Kayak, §29-
32. 
81 e.g. Experian/ClearScore, §9.10-9.18; Priceline/Kayak, §18-21; Amazon/The Book Depository, §9-26. 
82 e.g. MoneySupermarket/Decision Technologies, §37-41; JustEat/Hungryhouse, §2.16-2.34; Google/Waze, §15, 
20; Priceline/Kayak, §8-13, 43. 
83 e.g., TopCashBack/Quidco, §35-47; MoneySupermarket/Decision Technologies, §53-58. cf Kayak/Priceline, 
§41-45 and Lear Report (n 53) pp 89-90. 
84 See also Live Online Auction Platform Services, a Chapter II commitment decision. 
85 §29. 
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mergers involved zero price markets and the importance of indirect network effects were 
generally noted.86 
Nevertheless, the two-sidedness of digital platforms was arguably insufficiently appreciated in 
earlier market definitions. According to the Lear Report, in certain cases – for instance, 
Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze – too much emphasis was placed on product 
functionalities and on the users’ side of the market and little attention was given to business 
models and monetization strategies, a shortcoming which possibly undermined the 
subsequent assessment of these transactions.87 In recent decisions though, the CMA’s 
approach has been more sophisticated. In JustEat/Hungryhouse, the authority distinguished 
between platforms that facilitate transactions and those that do not. While in the latter case 
two separate markets may be defined, in the former ‘a single market definition is appropriate, 
which takes account of the competitive constraints on both sides of the market and assesses 
the hypothetical monopolist’s ability to increase the price of concluding a transaction, given 
the number of close substitutes on each side and the impact of any indirect network effects 
on the platform’.88 The same approach was followed in TopCashBack/Quidco89 and 
Experian/ClearScore.90 In all three cases, the CMA explained the difficulties of implementing 
the hypothetical monopolist test and considered demand-side and supply-side substitution 
based on the evidence. In JustEat/Hungryhouse the authority also noted that ‘where products 
and services on one side of the market are provided ‘free’ of charge, other dimensions of 
competition, such as quality, may be a more important measure of substitution than price on 
that side of the market’.91 
It is impossible to provide an exhaustive account of digital market definitions, but it is worth 
noting PayPal/iZettle, where one of the identified markets - omni-channel payment services 
by the same provider - was/is still nascent. Remarking that such services are an emerging 
trend and may develop rapidly with merchants’ demand, the CMA considered industry views 
on how this market might evolve ‘in the near future, rather than focusing solely on existing 
requirements and solutions’.92 
Question 5. How is market power established in the practice of your competition 
authority in cases relating to digital economy players?  
The CMA considers undertakings’ shares over time and the strength of any competitive 
constraints, including existing competition, potential competition and buyer power.93 With 
regards to mergers, since market power is assessed in the context of the examination of the 
competitive effects of the transaction, this answer should be read in conjunction with the 
response to Question 7. Generally, the conventional approach applies to both antitrust and 
merger digital economy cases. Large market shares may be cause for concern,94 although in 
                                               
86 e.g. TopCashBack/Quidco, §25; Experian/ClearScore, §7.8; eBay/Motors, §37; JustEat/Hungryhouse, §4.9; 
Google/Waze, §19; Google/BeatThatQuote, §11. 
87 Lear Report (n 53) p 117. 
88 §4.11 
89 §24-28 (see also Issues Statement in Phase 2, §13, 21). 
90 §9.6. 
91 §4.10. 
92 §6.49-6.75. 
93 For antitrust cases, see Guidelines on the Assessment of Market Power, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284400/oft415.
pdf. For merger cases, see Merger Guidelines, §5.3-5.6 and 5.7-5.9. 
94 e.g. Live Online Auction Platform Services, §3.11; TopCashBack/Quidco, §65. 
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merger investigations incremental increases will typically point towards the opposite 
conclusion.95 Furthermore, power in related markets may be taken into consideration.96 
That said, some particularities are worth noting. While market shares provide the starting point, 
the proper metric may be uncertain. In Facebook/Instagram the OFT relied on app 
downloads,97 but this measure did not reflect user engagement; actual usage data would have 
arguably been a better proxy.98 In Priceline/Kayak the OFT had reservations about relying on 
internet traffic and considered net revenue, volume and gross booking value as more 
appropriate benchmarks.99 More recently, in eBay/Motors the CMA calculated advertising 
shares by listing revenue, number of unique visitors and number of dealers, noting that ‘shares 
by revenue are likely to provide only limited insight into competitive conditions’.100 
Differentiated products and business models may further complicate this exercise. In 
Experian/ClearScore, the CMA calculated shares based on CCP revenues as consisting in 
commissions from financial product providers, noting though that, due to the different ways in 
which CCPs attract users - i.e. through a free CCT or not - ‘CCP-wide market shares may not 
fully reflect the strength of competitive constraints between different market participants’.101 
Furthermore, in eBay/Motors and PayPal/iZettle the authority acknowledged that in dynamic 
and fast-growing markets, shares of supply can provide some insight but may not be an 
appropriate guide to the competitive constraints currently faced by the parties, insofar as they 
provide a historical and static picture of competition, and should be thus given relatively limited 
weight.102 In view of this, the CMA has also considered more forward-looking measures, in 
particular new user acquisitions. In PayPal/iZettle, it held that the relative rates of new 
customer acquisition by different mPOS suppliers - as calculated on the basis of app 
downloads, whose limitations as a proxy were noted - are a more accurate measure of their 
competitive positions than shares by transaction volume.103 New user acquisitions based on 
subscription numbers were considered in Experian/ClearScore, too, as ‘particularly 
informative of the current competitive dynamic amongst free CCT’.104 
In any event, the presence of strong rivals which can sufficiently constrain the post-merger 
entity will prevent a finding of market power.105 Potential competition may also undermine such 
a provisional conclusion, where entry is timely,106 likely and sufficient. In digital economy 
cases, growth rates,107 future product developments and business plans,108 and entry barriers, 
such as network effects, incumbency advantages and access to data, are particularly relevant. 
In Live Online Auction Platform Services, dominance was provisionally found since ATG was 
‘faced with only a limited degree of potential competition’ due to existing network effects.109 
The absence of barriers to entry was key to the clearance of Web Reservations 
International/Hostelbookers.com: although combining the two largest online hostel booking 
portals, the CMA found that the growth of small, dynamic rivals would maintain sufficient 
                                               
95 e.g. Google/BeatThatQuote, §56-67; Blackbaud/Giving, §70. 
96 Abuse of dominance, §5.7 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284422/oft40
2.pdf) (see also Streetmap v Google Maps [2016] EWHC 253, [15], [98]); Merger Guidelines, §4.1.6, 5.6.2. 
97 §17. 
98 Lear Report (n 53), §II.28. 
99 §55-57. 
100 §47-48. 
101 §10.8. Also: TopCashBack/Quidco, §102-105. 
102 eBay/Motors, §49; PayPal/iZettle, §8.88. 
103 §8.41-8.46. 
104 §11.8. 
105e.g. Digital Property/Zoopla, §60; Google/Waze, §74; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §7.2; eBay/Motors, §102. 
106 Usually the CMA considers two years to be timely, but a shorter period may be considered (e.g. 
Experian/ClearScore, §13.26). 
107 e.g. eBay/Motors, §87-88, PayPal/iZettle, §8.34; cf TopBachBack/Quidco, §94. 
108 e.g. Experian/ClearScore, §11.37ff; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §6.42-6.50. 
109 §3.12. 
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competitive pressure.110 By contrast, in TopCashBack/Quidco, the CMA considered that ‘the 
infrastructure and investment required as well as the strategic and marketing barriers mean 
that barriers to entry and expansion are high’.111 The importance of user numbers, incumbency 
and scale to competing successfully was also noted in Experian/ClearScore112 and 
eBay/Motors.113 
Countervailing buyer power has rarely featured in digital economy decisions, though was 
explicitly rejected in TopCashBack/Quidco.114 
Question 6. Can you notice a difference in ex post assessments (abuse of dominance 
cases) and ex ante assessments (concentration merger control cases), both in relation 
to defining markets and conceptualizing market power? 
It is too early to identify any clear differences between ex post and ex ante assessments of 
market definition and market power in digital economy cases; the CMA’s only abuse of 
dominance case in digital markets is Live Online Auction Platform Services, which closed 
following commitments. Nevertheless, the CMA is monitoring digital economy issues and 
continues to develop its thinking in light of market investigations, market studies and consumer 
enforcement in the digital area. 
C. Anticompetitive behaviour in the digital economy 
Question 7. Which practices in digital markets or involving digital businesses have 
been analysed in the decision-making practices or case law of your jurisdiction? 
The CMA has completed cases analysing the following types of collusive behaviour under 
Chapter I CA1998: 
 Online sales limitations. All such arrangements were deemed to restrict competition by 
object. ‘Recommended’ prices amounted to online RPM in Pride,115 Bathroom Fittings116 
and Digital Pianos and Keyboards, where Casio used automated price change alerts to 
monitor compliance.117 Bans on online discounting were prohibited in Commercial 
Refrigeration118 and Light Fittings,119 and formed the basis of the subsequently quashed 
Hotel Online Booking commitments decision.120 Similar allegations were recently made 
against Fender.121 The other mobility scooter decision, Roma, involved preclusion of online 
advertising of offline prices and a ban on internet sales,122 a restriction by object to which 
the CMA returned in its decision against Ping, a customised golf club manufacturer.123 
 
 Algorithmic price collusion. In Posters and Frames the CMA prohibited such conduct as 
restrictive of competition by object.124 The parties adopted price-matching software for 
                                               
110 §103-124. 
111 §142-146. 
112 §7.28-7.29, 13.6-13.61. 
113 §103-106. 
114 §146-151. 
115 §3.197-3.128. 
116 §1.3-1.11, 6.39-6.52. 
117 §3.104-3.110. 
118 §1.3-1.9, 6.42-6.50.  
119 §3.41-3.91, 4.125-4.153. 
120 §5.1-5.14. 
121 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-alleges-guitar-firm-illegally-prevented-price-discounts. 
122 §3.159-3.197. 
123 Sports Equipment, §3.78-3.122.  
124 §5.42-5.50. 
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products sold via Amazon, autonomously adjusting prices to the same level.125 The 
potential for algorithmic pricing to facilitate explicit and tacit collusion was noted in the 
CMA’s 2018 Working Paper.126 
 
 MFN clauses. Although the primary concern was RPM, the firms investigated in Hotel 
Online Booking agreed not to enforce or use MFN clauses to ensure RPM did not 
materialise indirectly.127 
MFN clauses were also the subject of the only digital markets decision pursuant to Chapter II 
CA1998. Live Online Auction Platform Services involved platforms bringing together auction 
houses and consumers to facilitate real-time online bids at offline auctions.128 Alongside 
exclusivity obligations and restrictions on advertising competitors,129 MFN clauses prevented 
auction houses from securing agreements with rival platforms offering more favourable terms 
to bidders.130 
One practice deemed not to breach Chapter I CA1998 was a ‘one other portal’ quasi-
exclusivity rule for online platforms. The CAT and the Court of Appeal agreed that 
OnTheMarket, an online property portal, could restrict agents from listing properties on more 
than one other online portal, as this was objectively necessary for its effective operation.131 
The High Court has also ruled that Google’s preferential display of its own map service did not 
breach the Chapter II prohibition. Based on the evidence, such presentation was not 
reasonably likely to appreciably affect competition by foreclosing rival map providers.132 
The CMA has mostly engaged with the digital economy through merger control. Although 
certain transactions fell short of jurisdictional requirements,133 the majority have been cleared 
in Phase 1. In determining whether a merger has resulted or is expected to result in a 
substantial lessening of competition (SLC),134 the CMA applies the Merger Guidelines and 
compares its effects against the foreseeable competitive situation absent the concentration, 
i.e. the counterfactual.135 As noted in Question 5, market shares, existing competition and 
countervailing factors, such as barriers to entry and buyer power, are relevant. Efficiency 
arguments, considered in Question 8, are also pertinent. In horizontal mergers, the closeness 
of competition between the parties is very important, as demonstrated by: the similarity of 
pricing136 or service offered;137 customer perceptions as to comparative functionality;138 the 
extent of switching;139 brand recognition;140 and online customer location.141 In the few non-
horizontal mergers in digital markets reviewed by the authority, the ordinary analytical 
                                               
125 ibid, §3.62-3.93. 
126 Pricing Algorithms (n 51) 23-31.  
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128 §2.15, 2.19. 
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130 ibid, §3.15. 
131 Agents' Mutual v Gascoigne Halman [2017] CAT 15; [2019] EWCA Civ 24. 
132 Streetmap (n 96), [99]-[141]. 
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134 ss35-36 Enterprise Act 2002. 
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framework of ability and incentive to foreclose and competitive effect was applied, but no 
concerns were identified.142 
While some early decisions did not squarely address possible digital economy implications,143 
such considerations have featured more prominently in recent analysis.  
Firstly, although in most cases the pre-existing conditions of competition were taken as the 
relevant benchmark, more competitive counterfactuals have been occasionally considered, as 
recommended in the Lear Report.144 In Experian/ClearScore the CMA rejected the parties’ 
claim that rivals would exert greater competitive constraints in the future owing to regulatory 
and technological developments, since their impact was not sufficiently foreseeable.145 In 
contrast, in PayPal/iZettle the authority concluded that, absent the acquisition, PayPal would 
have strong incentives to improve its offering.146 
Secondly, merger analysis has incorporated other digital economy factors. Multi-homing, for 
instance, has been taken to indicate the ease of switching, thus mitigating the likelihood of 
post-merger exercises of market power.147 In Just Eat/Hungryhouse the CMA investigated 
whether customers may cut out the intermediary and go directly to the supplier-side, thereby 
constraining the platform.148 In Digital Property/Zoopla the authority noted that network effects 
generated by the scale of the merging parties may inhibit the growth and competitive pressure 
of smaller rivals, while conversely the significant network effects enjoyed by larger rivals may 
limit the post-merger entity’s ability to exercise market power.149 The former phenomenon was 
important in provisionally prohibiting the Experian/ClearScore acquisition, as combining the 
two-sided user groups of their CCPs would inhibit customer switching.150 In Just 
Eat/Hungryhouse the CMA rejected the claim that network effects led to a ‘winner-takes-all’ 
market for online food ordering platforms.151 
Finally, the general opportunities presented by the digital economy have been referenced as 
reducing barriers to entry, such as the ease of new app development152 or producers’ use of 
online trading platforms.153 
As noted earlier, the CMA requested views on its approach to digital mergers to inform a 
review of the existing Merger Guidelines. Importantly, it invited thoughts on the features that 
may be relevant to the assessment of mergers in digital markets, such as their multi-sided 
nature, users paying for products or services through non-monetary means (e.g. personal 
data), the relevance of data assets for competition and the significance of network effects.154 
                                               
142 Merger Guidelines, §5.6. e.g. CVC Capital/Sky Bet, §49-70; Experian/ClearScore, §12.1-12.53; 
Google/BeatThatQuote, §94-109; Moneysupermarket.com/Decision Technologies, §158-167; Blackbaud/Giving, 
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147 Google/BeatThatQuote, §51; Blackbaud/Giving, §66-69; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §6.71, 6.74; 
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153 Amazon/Book Depository, §109, 114, 116. 
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Question 8. What reasons have been offered by the businesses concerned to justify 
(prima facie) anticompetitive behaviour? 
Efficiency justifications have not featured prominently in digital economy decisions: parties 
have not raised them in Chapter I infringements;155 the only Chapter II investigation was 
concluded with commitments; most mergers have been cleared due to lack of concerns; and 
some prima facie problematic mergers were cancelled.156 
Nevertheless, in Roma and Pride the firms argued that online sales restrictions and RPM were 
necessary to prevent internet distributors free-riding upon the investments of brick-and-mortar 
shops.157 They argued that the rise of internet sellers with lower operating costs necessitated 
substantial protection for offline distributors from free-riding and undercutting. These 
efficiencies were dismissed as lacking in evidence as to whether they mitigated free-riding, 
outweighed the resultant higher prices, or couldn’t be achieved through less restrictive means. 
Free-riding on offline customisation services was also advanced by Ping to justify an online 
sales ban,158 further said to be necessary to protect its luxury brand image for personalised 
clubs.159 The CMA rejected this latter argument as an objective justification or mitigating 
efficiency for the practice.160 The ban was not indispensable for customers to acquire 
personalised clubs, with a range of less restrictive alternatives available.161 
Digital Property/Zoopla acknowledged the multi-sidedness of online property portals and 
recognised that the merged entity’s greater network effects increased competitive pressure 
upon the market leader.162 Network effects on two-sided markets made it difficult for smaller 
platforms to grow organically, an issue eased by accumulating scale through mergers.163 The 
pro-competitive consequences of strengthening the merged entity’s network effects through 
combining their users and agents thus factored heavily in the clearance decision.164 
Lastly, while not technically justificatory efficiencies, the CMA has occasionally noted the 
procompetitive rationale for otherwise unproblematic digital economy mergers – e.g. 
economies of scale,165 combining differing business expertise,166 and entering new geographic 
markets.167 
Question 9. Have you witnessed the emergence of specific theories of harm tailored to 
digital markets? 
The CMA has routinely stressed that pre-existing concepts are sufficient to meet issues arising 
in digital economy markets.168 Whilst some of the practices which give rise to harm may differ 
                                               
155 Bathroom Fittings; Commercial Refrigeration; Posters and Frames; Light Fittings. 
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in the online and offline world, the underlying theories of harm that have been investigated (or 
posited) in digital markets are in many cases not new. However, with the abundance of merger 
clearances and the small number of infringement decisions, opportunities for experimentation 
have been limited. 
Chapter I infringement decisions concerning online selling restrictions are based upon similar 
theories of competitive harm. Internet sales bans soften price competition amongst online and 
offline outlets, restrict retailers from accessing a broader consumer base, limit consumers to 
local distributors, prevent 24-hour purchases, and hinder the use of online tools facilitating 
shopping around (search engines, PCWs).169 The theory of harm underpinning the prohibition 
of online RPM likewise focuses upon the internet as a tool for fierce competition and 
discounting, dulled by the imposition of a singular price.170 RPM further prevents the lower 
overheads of internet distributors from being translated into reduced prices,171 and may be a 
barrier to entry in markets where firms aggressively discount to acquire scale.172 
The theory of harm in the Live Online Auction Platform Services commitments decision was 
that ‘wide’ MFN clauses may foreclose competing online platforms by acting as a financial 
penalty on auctioneers securing more favourable terms for bidders on rival platforms, as they 
required the investigated firm’s bidders to be given the same terms (while still paying its agreed 
commission fee).173 The pending investigation into MFN clauses and home insurance PCWs 
suggest a two-fold theory of harm: that ‘wide’ MFN clauses prevent price competition between 
PCWs on discounted insurance to consumers; and reduce competition on the commission 
rates charged by PCWs to insurance providers which may inflate consumer prices.174 These 
theories reflect the CMA’s broader thinking.175 ‘Wide’ MFNs preventing both service providers 
and rival PCWs from offering more favourable terms have been found to eliminate inter-
website price competition without convincing efficiency justifications.176 In contrast, ‘narrow’ 
MFN clauses only preventing providers from directly offering services on more favourable 
terms than the PCW are less problematic, since they maintain the business credibility of PCWs 
by preventing suppliers from free-riding on their advertising efforts.177 
CMA publications on digital markets have discussed additional theories of harm, including: 
consumer exploitation through price discrimination facilitated by data collected on previous 
online visits, transactions and evidence of shopping around;178 hollowing-out, i.e. using the 
consumer focus upon pricing in digital comparison tools to reduce product quality;179 non-
resolicitation, i.e. agreements between digital comparison tools and service providers 
preventing the former from contacting previous customers, reducing the visibility of 
offers/competing suppliers and hampering innovation in targeted marketing;180 and non-brand 
bidding/negative keywords matching, i.e. agreements between rival brands to prevent each 
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other’s offerings being simultaneously advertised in paid online search results when specific 
brands/keywords are input.181 
The primary theory of harm horizontal digital mergers coheres with other enforcement: that 
the loss of actual competition between rivals may create or strengthen a position of market 
power, usually through subsequent price rises,182 or sometimes reduced product/service 
range183 or quality degradation.184 Occasionally the CMA has noted that increased market 
power may dull future incentives to invest in innovation, but – as suggested by the Furman 
Report185– this theory of harm has not been substantiated in detail.186 Despite the dearth of 
detailed assessments in digital economy mergers of coordinated187 and unilateral non-
horizontal effects, the CMA has seemingly maintained pre-existing theories of harm.188The 
novelty derives more from the means by which such harms to competition may be achieved: 
manipulation of search engine results,189 preferential treatment of online platforms by related 
PCWs,190 or deteriorating interoperability between social media networks and photo sharing 
apps.191 
A common apprehension in digital markets is harm to potential future competition and 
innovation resulting from established technology companies acquiring fledgling rivals, whether 
actual or potential.192 Early decisions often dismissed concerns by emphasising incremental 
market share changes, potential future entry with ease and the firms not currently competing 
closely.193 Following Facebook/Instagram, an acquisition cleared largely based on Instagram’s 
then lack of advertising profits,194 Google/Waze was more alert to possible harm to future 
competition,195 but found little reason to believe that Waze would become a strong competitor 
to Google Maps.196 The most extensive engagement with this theory was in PayPal/iZettle. 
Nevertheless, the CMA found no evidence of an anticompetitive motive for the acquisition,197 
nor that iZettle was likely to significantly expand its online offering to compete with PayPal as 
an omni-channel payment systems provider.198 
The standard of proof for antitrust infringement decisions and for merger prohibitions is the 
balance of probabilities (i.e. more likely than not).199 The Furman Report advocated a ‘balance 
of harms’ approach, whereby merger assessment would weigh up not only the likelihood but 
also the magnitude of both the harms and the benefits of the transaction.200 The CMA is 
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concerned that this would be a fundamental shift in merger policy, raising practical challenges 
and possibly unintended consequences.201 
Question 10. What kind of remedies have been employed in cases relating to digital 
markets? Do you see any differences to remedies in other markets? 
Few remedies have been employed in cases relating to digital markets, which have largely 
cohered with other enforcement. 
 As restrictions by object, all Chapter I infringement decisions invited fines under s36 
CA1998.202 Some were lowered for cooperation with the CMA and/or following the 
settlement procedure,203 while others were reduced on appeal.204 Under ss32-33 CA1998, 
the CMA has also imposed binding directions to order defendants to cease adopting and 
enforcing prohibited contractual terms,205 where the investigated conduct has not already 
ended.206 
 
 The commitments secured pursuant to ss31A-31E CA1998 in Live Online Auction Platform 
Services simply prevented the investigated conduct: the firm would not enter contracts 
limiting auction houses from using other platforms, negotiating better terms, or advertising 
rival services. The commitments in Hotel Online Booking were more proactive. Although 
MFN clauses were subject to cessation, RPM was remedied by commitments permitting 
online travel agents and hotels to discount to membership groups and to publicise their 
ability to do so. However, the decision was subsequently quashed by the CAT.207 
 
 The vast majority of digital economy mergers have been unconditionally cleared without 
the need to consider remedial commitments.208 
Although not a decision, the ‘Open Banking’ remedy arising from the retail banking market 
investigation utilised the digital economy to facilitate greater competition.209 To improve 
switching between current accounts, the CMA recommended the development of an open 
application programming interface (API) for banking.210 This would allow intermediaries 
between banks and customers – finance platforms, apps, PCWs – to access up-to-date 
information from major banks and customers to thereby recommend accounts tailored to their 
individual needs.211 
D. Regulatory overlap and enforcement challenges 
Question 11. Has there been any overlap in practice between ex ante regulation aimed 
at controlling market behaviour – such as, but not limited to, consumer protection 
legislation, the proposed platform Regulation, the GDPR, the geo-blocking Regulation, 
the ePrivacy Directive and/or proposed ePrivacy Regulation, or similar national 
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instruments of legislation in relation to most favoured nation clauses– and the 
enforcement practice of competition authorities?  
UK competition law is complemented by the following ex ante regulation: 
 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA2015).227 Part 1 provides consumer rights against 
businesses supplying goods, services and paid-for (only) digital content.212 Part 2 makes 
unfair non-core terms in consumer contracts not binding, with Schedule 2 listing terms 
which may or must be regarded as unfair. The CMA has occasionally indicated how such 
terms might apply in the digital economy.213 
 
 The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs).230 These prohibit 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices. Typically, unfair practices contravene 
requirements of professional diligence.214 The CPRs specifically prohibit misleading actions 
and omissions,215 aggressive practices,216 and a list of conduct ‘in all circumstances 
considered unfair’,217 a number of which are relevant to the digital economy.218 The 
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 impose additional information 
obligations on online traders. 
 
 The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003219 and the 
Data Protection Act 2018, the latter of which implements the GDPR.220 These constitute 
the UK data protection regime. 
 
 The Geo-Blocking Regulation221 and the Geo-Blocking (Enforcement) Regulations 2018, 
which designated the CMA as the body responsible for enforcing the prohibitions included 
within Articles 3-5. 
 
 Given the UK’s decision to leave the EU, it is unclear whether legal changes will be 
introduced to implement the Platform Regulation.222 The CMA was initially unconvinced that 
such an instrument was necessary, its preference being for guidance, self-regulation and 
ex post competition/consumer protection enforcement.223 
Although ex ante regulation imposes various requirements on digital economy firms, the 
greatest possibility for overlap derives from ex post enforcement. 
 This is especially true of UK consumer protection law due to the CMA’s dual role. In addition 
to CA1998, the authority also enforces the CRA2015 and the CPRs.224 Consumer 
enforcement is seen as supporting competition through: facilitating well-informed consumer 
decision-making which rewards the best firms; addressing practices which hinder 
transparency or switching; and ensuring a level playing-field of fair business behaviour.225 
                                               
212 s33. 
213 e.g. Consumer Data (n 43) 16. 
214 Regulation 3. 
215 Regulations 5-6. 
216 Regulation 7. 
217 Schedule 1. 
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219 Implementing Directive 2002/58/EC. 
220 Regulation 2016/679. 
221 Regulation 2018/302. 
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223 CMA Response: Online Platforms (n 168); CMA Response: Regulatory Environment for Platforms (n 168). 
224 Part 8 of the Enterprise Act. For other regulations enforced: CMA, Consumer Protection: Enforcement Guidance 
(2016) Annex A. 
225 Consumer Protection, ibid §2.2. 
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This cohesion is demonstrated by investigations into paid-for positive online 
endorsements,226 opaque charges and terms for internet transactions,227 automatic renewal 
of digital services228 and the reliability of internet reviews.229 Other consumer protection 
investigations in digital markets have focused upon preventing exploitation (e.g. websites 
charging for free government services,230 unfair terms and practices by online gambling 
firms)231 and protecting vulnerable groups (e.g. children pressurised into in-game/app 
purchases).232 While consumer enforcement has been a valuable complement to 
competition enforcement, the inability to order cessation and impose fines independently 
of courts has led the CMA’s Chairman to suggest that its consumer powers are ‘unfit’ for 
purpose and should be boosted.233 
 
 Data protection and privacy requirements are enforced by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO). The ICO has often undertaken action against digital economy firms, including 
fining Uber for failing to protect customer’s data during a cyber-attack,234 penalising 
Facebook for not sufficiently guarding user data from app developers,235 and an 
undertaking from WhatsApp not to share data with Facebook until data protection concerns 
were addressed.236 It has also published materials on privacy and data in mobile apps,237 
cloud computing,238 social networks239 and a report on big data, AI and machine learning.240 
Some of the CMA’s consumer protection investigations have also touched on privacy241 
and its publications occasionally raise related issues.242 Rather than inconsistent 
aspirations, its Report into the commercial use of consumer data viewed competition, 
consumer protection, and privacy as operating in tandem: of firms competing in a “race to 
the top” to offer users the most protective and transparent data collection policy.243 The on-
going market study into online platforms and digital advertising will also look at consumer 
control over data collection practices, particularly assessing measures to improve 
transparency and consent for data collected for sale to advertisers.244 
 
 As of yet, there has been no enforcement pursuant to the Geo-Blocking Regulation. 
Whether the Platform Regulation will apply in the UK from July 2020 is unknown. 
                                               
226https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/handpicked-media-ltd-non-disclosure-of-commercial-blogging-activity; 
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Question 12. Which authorities are responsible for enforcing competition law in the 
digital economy in your jurisdiction?  
Under s54 CA1998, various regulators have concurrent powers to enforce the Chapter I and 
Chapter II prohibitions: Ofcom; Ofgem (gas and electricity); Water Services Regulation 
Authority (OFWAT); Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation; Office of Rail and Road 
(ORR); Civil Aviation Authority (CAA); Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); Payment Systems 
Regulator (PRS); and NHS Improvement. The CMA is the sole decision-maker for mergers.245 
Coherent antitrust enforcement was strengthened by the ERRA13 and the Competition Act 
1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014, which facilitate information-sharing, notification of 
proposed investigations, and case transferral. The CMA has published guidance on the 
concurrent application of competition law in regulated industries246 and agreed memoranda of 
understanding with each enforcement body.247 Together they constitute the UK Competition 
Network, which aims to promote strategic dialogue, cooperative enforcement and share best 
practices.248 Given the sectors overseen by the concurrent enforcers, engagement with digital 
economy markets beyond the CMA has been limited. One exception is Ofgem’s investigation 
into negative keywords agreements between energy PCWs, preventing rival advertisements 
displaying in response to certain search inputs. This investigation was transferred to the CMA 
and closed on administrative priority grounds.249 
With respect to consumer protection, CRA2015 enforcement is shared with Trading Standards 
Services (TSS), the concurrent sector regulators, ICO and the Consumers’ Association 
(Which?).250 TSS, operating at local government level, are also the lead enforcers of the CPRs. 
Case allocation is managed through the National Trading Standards Board and there is a legal 
duty to notify enforcement action. The CMA typically takes the lead against systemic market 
failures or practices with market-wide implications, where a legal precedent is necessary and 
strong deterrence or compensation is required.251 In 2019 the CMA Chairman recommended 
‘entrenching a division of responsibilities’ for enforcement between the CMA and TSS.252 
Chapter I and II infringement decisions, findings of legality, commitment decisions, and 
penalties are appealable from the CMA to the CAT,253 while other actions can be judicially 
reviewed by the High Court. A person aggrieved by a merger decision can also apply to the 
CAT for review.254 Opportunities for the CAT to consider digital economy issues have been 
rare, though include accepting the “one portal only” rule in Agents’ Mutual,255 quashing the 
online hotel booking commitments decision in Skyscanner,256 and finding a non-decisive error 
of law in Ping.257 Concerns have been raised about the length and cost of CAT proceedings.258 
The Chairman of the CMA also recently expressed dissatisfaction with the intensity of review 
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applied by the CAT and recommended a more flexible standard of review for CMA fact-finding 
and legal analysis,259 as echoed in the Furman Report.260 
                                               
259 ibid 12, 36, 39-40. 
260 Furman Report (n 56), 14, 106. 
